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Abstract: Conventional wisdom holds that most software suits
are being prosecuted by so-called patent trolls seeking quick,
lucrative settlements on frivolous patents. But the reality is
quite otherwise. Bad patents make for bad cases, and even the
best lawyers lose bad cases. Given the complexity and cost of
patent litigation, frivolous cases are the rarity, not the rule. The
perception to the contrary reflects not the underlying reality, but
rather the very effective lobbying of several larger "Patent
Fairness" organizations, whose members are the very large
technology companies most frequently defendants in these
cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the sleepy village of Santa Clara, there lived a very wealthy
but very frightened giant named Intel. Intel was plagued by
a fearsome band of evil trolls-patent trolls, to be
exact-who wanted a glittering pot of gold in exchange for
doing absolutely nothing. And they were very powerful
because they said they owned the patent on some of the
magic Intel used to become rich.,
So it began with a clever article in 2001 about Intel and its patent
troubles in a San Francisco legal newspaper. In the years since, the
existence and attributes of patent trolls have become articles of faith,
the enduring stuff of urban legend.2
We are told these trolls "coerce law-abiding companies to pay
large licensing fees" by filing frivolous suits.3 Honorable companies
are "being held ransom by tiny outfits whose only assets are 'kooky
and vague' patents."4 Frivolous patent suits are described as a tax on
the system, even a serious threat to innovation itself.5 Patent
litigation is seen as "basically mugging someone," 6 and patent
I Brenda Sandburg, Trollingfor Dollars: Patent Enforcers are Scaring Corporate
America, and They're Getting Rich-Very Rich-Doing it, RECORDER, July 30, 2001, at 1,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/PubArticle.jsp?id=1024079075491.
2 And the subject of legislative "reform," currently underway.
3 Patent Law Reform: Injunctions and Damages: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Prop. Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo9th Cong., 151 CONG. REC.
D599-o2 (June 14, 2oo6) (testimony of Jonathan Band, Counsel on Behalf of Visa U.S.A.
and Financial Services Roundtable), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/printtestimony.cfm?id= 1535&witjid=4351.
4 Jason Kirby, Patent Troll or Producer? The Evolution ofIntellectual Property, FIN. POST,
Jan. 14, 20o6, http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/financialpost/story.html?id=
15o9d361-0144-4432-b6dc-2c14o26c98d6&k=39270.
5 Joe Beyers, Rise of the Patent Trolls, CNET NEws.cOM, April 2, 2007,
http://www.news.com/21o2-1o71-3-5892996.html?tag=st.util.print.
6 Hacking with Greg, http://drinkbroken.typepad.com/drinkbroken/2007/o8/software-
patent.html (Aug. 22, 2007).
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plaintiffs "modern day highway robbers."7 It is "patent terrorism," a
"cottage industry of extortion."8
Come, now-gold may be good, but extort money from the likes of
Microsoft and Google by filing frivolous patent suits? These
companies are many things, but stupid is not one of them. Of course
there are bad patents. But bad patents make for bad cases, and even
the best lawyers lose bad cases. Far from being a "simple and effective
source of illegitimate profit,"9 filing frivolous patent suits is a fast
track to a Chapter 11 filing.
The proof lies in the numbers. Take Acacia Research Corporation,
perhaps the patent troll poster child. This intellectual property
holding company reported gross revenues of just $34 million in
calendar year 2006, about what IBM makes in a week licensing IBM
patents. Yet, Acacia is an extortionist and IBM an icon. What gives?
Large technology companies devote sizeable sums of money to
innocuously named lobbying groups seeking "patent reform," like the
"Coalition for Patent Fairness," (is anyone really for patent
unfairness?) and the Orwellian "Business Software Alliance" or "BSA."
These organizations have done an extraordinary job building the
perception that the patent system is broken, the economy is clogged
with bad patents, and that something desperately needs to be done
right now. In terms of the calculated misimpression created, a more
accurate name for these organizations would be the "Coalition to
Immunize Large Infringers from Pesky Patent Suits."1o
These efforts may still prove successful in reshaping patent law
since that process is yet underway. But the attacks and
mischaracterizations have already been successful in a subtle, but
important way: in shaping the way federal district court judges view
patent cases, especially software cases. This outcome may have been
the real object of the exercise all along.
7 Maggie Shiels, Technology Industry Hits Out at 'Patent Trolls', BBC ONLINE NEws, June
2, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/i/hi/business/37225o9.stm.
8 Shannon Pettypiece, Frivolous Patent Suits Drawing Industry Attention, CRAIN'S
CLEVELAND Bus., Oct. 25, 2004, at 6, available at http://findarticles.com/p/
articles/mi-g01575/is_20041o/ai-n7333533.
9 Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Prop., Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, l08th Cong. 58 (2003)
(statement of David M. Simon, Chief Patent Counsel, Intel Corporation), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju88545.ooo/hju88 54 5_o.htm.
10 And their motto could be, "Hey! We could have invented that."
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Consider this: if a federal judge believes that the patent system is
broken and most software patents suspect,'1 that judge is likely to
approach patent cases with considerable skepticism. Such skepticism
can change the way the court thereafter views claim construction,
enablement, invalidity, and now-importantly-obviousness.12 A
judge who believes that the patent system is broken may be
significantly more inclined to grant an obviousness summary
judgment motion than one who believes the patent system basically
valid, with a few aberrant patents on the margin. In patent cases,
judges are becoming powerful gatekeepers, just as they did in antitrust
cases post-Matshushita.3 Tort reform has now settled on patent law.
In short, perception matters. But, unhappily (at least for some),
perception about patent trolls specifically, and patent litigation
generally, just does not accord with reality. From the perspective of
an intellectual property plaintiffs lawyer, the view from the trenches
is much different. Here's why.
II. MYTH ONE: PLA!NTIFFS WILL BRING FRivoLOus PATENT CASES
Perhaps the most common refrain in the patent debate is that
plaintiffs will bring frivolous cases to extort unjustified settlements.
The following over-heated quotes are quite typical:
" "[F]rivolous patent holders . . . intimidate true
innovators into paying protection money."4
* The "unpredictable legal environment has
encouraged legitimate companies threatened by
patent trolls to pay large settlements...."is
1A monkey with a typewriter can get a patent. Look at 6,368,227 (swinging technique)
and 6,004,596 (sealed, crustless, peanut butter sandwich). See U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227
(filed Nov. 17,2000) and U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (filed Dec. 12, 1999).
12 See KSR Int'l v. Teleflex, Inc. 127 S. Ct. 1727(2007).
13 Matshushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (judge
essentially weighed evidence on summary judgment to decide if conspiracy more likely
than not).
14 Adam Jaffe & Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2006,
at A14.
15 Patent Quality Improvement, supra note 9, at 5.
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* "The present patent law is subject to abuse by patent
holders who go fishing for infringers, or worse,
coerce law-abiding companies to pay large licensing
fees."'
6
" "Google and other technology companies
increasingly face mounting legal costs to defend
against frivolous patent claims from parties gaming
the system to forestall competition or reap windfall
profits."17
" "Patent trolls invent nothing and produce nothing.
They do not contribute innovation to society.
Rather, they exploit flaws in the patent system by
purchasing excessively broad and questionable
patents on ubiquitous software and e-commerce
technologies, and demanding payment from many
who use them. They give nothing to the economy or
society; they only take for themselves."8
* "Technology companies are often subject to suits by
persons more interested in reaping a quick buck
through settling the suit rather than exercising their
patent."19
These perceptions are all terribly naive. A frivolous patent case
remains just a frivolous case. Smart companies, particularly those
frequently sued, do not settle frivolous cases. While doing so might
save money against defense costs in one case, the cost of being seen as
a soft settlement touch will be brutally expensive across the entire
16 Patent Law Reform, supra note 3, at 3.
17 Posting of Johanna Shelton and Michelle Lee to Google Public Policy Blog,
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2oo7/o9/reforming-patents-promoting-
innovation.html (Sept. 4, 2007,14:44 PST).
18 Rita S. Heimes, Patent Trolls Prey on SMEs, 9 U. MAINE J. L. & INNOVATION 5
(unpublished comment, on file with University of Maine Journal of Law and Innovation),
available at http://tlc.usm.maine.edu/cli-admin/journalpdf/
voloooissueoooarticleoo9.PDF.
19 Posting of Niall Walsh to [ILUG] Patents Again,
http://mail.linux.ie/pipermail/ilug/2005-April/o78862.html (Apr. 26, 2005, 18:29 EST).
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litigation portfolio, reaching ever into the future. A big technology
company simply cannot afford cheap settlements.
Take Microsoft, for example: at any given time, Microsoft is
defending literally scores of patent cases. Invariably, the company
will conduct a pragmatic litigation risk assessment of the claim,
determine the claim's real value, and settle for that much and no
more. If a claim is truly frivolous, Microsoft will not settle, period. If
the plaintiff does not understand that, or wants more than a non-
frivolous claim is worth, Microsoft will pay several of its hundreds of
retained lawyers to try the case; it does so frequently all over the
country. This is just good business.
Now, what does this mean to the aspiring plaintiffs lawyer? The
cost of building and trying a patent case can easily exceed $4 million.
No sane plaintiffs lawyer would spend this kind of money on a
frivolous case. Even if the plaintiff had a good claims construction;
survived repeated invalidity, anticipation, and obviousness summary
judgment motions; prevailed at trial; and persuaded the trial judge
not to take away the verdict post-trial, there remains the Federal
Circuit. A frivolous patent claim will fair poorly in that court,
especially today. Frivolous cases simply do not pay. To assert
otherwise is to say that Microsoft, Google, Intel and others are
irrational, which is, as the engineers would say, counterfactual.
Now it is one thing for Microsoft to spend $3 to $4 million
defending a case--it can afford it. But it is quite another for a small
intellectual property holding company and/or its counsel to spend $4
million and then lose-do that once or twice and the defense side
starts to look very appealing.
For these reasons, a plaintiffs IP practice tends to be self-
regulating and disciplined by self-interested economic rationality. A
plaintiffs lawyer simply does not have the power to extort
unwarranted settlements in weak cases. To the contrary, a company
that carefully invests in its reputation as being slow to settle and
expensive to sue may well have the ability to settle claims at a discount
relative to the risk-weighted litigation value. These practical realities
mean the central premise of the pro-patent reformers-that weak
cases lead to extortionate settlements-is just flat wrong. 20
20 Though there are silly cases. For example, a 2001 declaratory judgment complaint
testing the fairly notorious PB&J patent spouted off a multiyear fight that has yet to be
resolved. See, e.g., Albie's Foods, Inc. v. Menusaver, Inc., 17o F. Supp. 2d 736 (E.D. Mich.
2001). The case involved U.S. patent 6,004,596, "Sealed Crustless Sandwich," which was
really a simple peanut butter and jelly sandwich, owned by a unit ofjam giant, Smuckers.
This is a ridiculous patent-and a profoundly silly legal proceeding-but one hopes the
[Vol. 4:1
But what of injunctive relief and the specter of shutting down a
defendant's business? "The trolls can use these patents to threaten to
shut down the entire computing industry with a court order
injunction, no matter how minor the feature that has been patented
is."21 Typical of the criticism is the following from a CNET article
captioned "The Shakedown Is On":
[T]rolls can seek an injunction on a company's product
shipments even though the trolls have no customers or
market share to lose. This unfair and ethically questionable
advantage is rapidly emerging as one of the biggest threats
corporations face today and could radically hamper the very
nature of innovation.22
Hardly. Getting an injunction on behalf of a perceived troll on a
minor feature incorporated into an important software product is
somewhat like trying to teach a dodo to fly: the bird was flightless and
is now extinct. It just will not happen. Given all the hysteria about
injunctive relief and consequent settlement leverage, how often has a
court actually entered an injunction on behalf of a perceived troll to
shut down an ongoing business? I know of no case, though perhaps
the now-notorious RIM case came closest (injunction threatened but
not in place).23 One case out of thousands hardly constitutes a
litigation crisis.
To put it differently, to secure an injunction, the plaintiff will have
to persuade a district court judge that the patent is strong, the
likelihood of prevailing great, and the injunction necessary, fair, and
just (and, as a practical matter, not sought to leverage a quick
settlement). If the plaintiff makes this showing, why should the
injunction not be issued?
Another frequent anti-patent criticism rests on the notion that a
portfolio owner can readily spew out scores of infringement notice
letters and demand modest sums for a license, which the recipients
will pay given inherent litigation cost and uncertainty. The articulated
point here is that it is sensible, from the would-be defendant's
patent holder and its lawyers make this kind of mistake only once. See U.S. Patent No.
6,004,596 (filed Dec. 12, 1999).
21 Shiels, supra note 7.
22Beyers, supra note 5.
23 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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perspective, to pay a several hundred thousand dollar troll toll to
avoid more expensive litigation, even if the patent claim is weak.
Once again the reality is otherwise. If the patent claim is weak,
and if the patent holder is looking for a modest license, this means
that the claim organically has little value. While the defendant may
not want to spend significant sums on lawyers defending the case, why
would the defendant think that the plaintiff is willing to make an
irrational decision and spend millions of dollars prosecuting a weak
claim against an individual defendant or defendants? If the patent
holder sues numerous defendants together, there is strength in
numbers, and great economy of scale, and the joined case can be
defended economically. In fact an often smart defense that moves on
receipt of such a shakedown letter would be to immediately file a
declaratory relief action in a remote jurisdiction of the defendant's
choice. It is one thing to write blustering letters but quite another to
spend money on counsel defending a declaratory relief action far, far
away.
At the end of the day, it is simply wrong to say, as the patent critics
do, that the area is rife with silly suits that somehow, paradoxically,
produce rich returns. It is just not so, which brings us to myth two.
III. MYTH Two: PATENT TROLLING IS A "VERY, VERY
PROFITABLE BUSINESS MODEL"24
Another firmly held belief is that the patent trolling and litigation
business is fabulously profitable. For example:
* "Several problems contribute to making this
'patent troll' business model a simple and
effective source of illegitimate profit
irrespective of the quality of the patent."25
* "The key to the new industry's success has been
a small, yet aggressive, army of lawyers who
help enforcers hammer companies with
infringement claims. And the attorneys, like the
24 Shiels, supra note 7.
25 Patent Quality Improvement, supra note 9, at 3.
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patent enforcement shops they represent, are
getting rich-very rich."26
Well, this too is more myth than reality. While there are outliers, the
patent trolling business is just not that lucrative. Take Acacia
Research as an example-here are the numbers: in fiscal year ("FY")
2006, Acacia recognized license revenue of $34.8 million. This
compares with FY05 revenue of $19.6 million, and FY04 revenue of
$4.3 million. All-in, over the last three years (which represents the
most fevered part of the patent troll debate), this leading patent troll
grossed just $58.7 million, less than $20 million a year in gross
revenue enforcing a patent portfolio covering thousands of patents
held by 39 separate Acacia companies.27 It would be interesting to
compare this sum to what the members of the BSA spent on that
organization and related lobbying efforts over the same period.
Acacia's revenues did not come cheaply. The company's 2006
annual SEC Form io-K filing notes an "increase in patent related legal
expenses in 20o6, as compared to 2005 .... 28 This increase reflected
two underlying factors: (1) a "net increase in the number of ongoing
patent enforcement litigations in 2006 compared to 2005"; and (2) an
increase in the number of outside law firms engaged on "an hourly or
discounted hourly basis."29
These trends are revealing and likely bode poorly for Acacia.
Fewer defendants are settling, litigation is growing more
commonplace and expensive, and likely more risky (note the increase
in lawyers who insist on at least an hourly component: one test of the
validity of a patent claim is whether IP counsel are willing to take the
case on a pure contingency basis). Some of this undoubtedly reflects
the pillorying Acacia received in the press as a patent troll.
Acacia's legal expenses are also increasing. In 2006 it spent about
$7.5 million on contingency counsel, and another $4.5 million on
hourly counsel and case costs. After paying the lawyers and the
inventors (often on a royalty revenue share basis3o), there just is not
26 Sandburg, supra note I, at i.
27 Acacia Research Co., Annual Report (Form o-K), at 1, 2 (Mar. 16, 2006).
28Id. at 70.
29 Id.
30 And one would assume that the inventors are demanding higher royalty share
percentages, given all of the press about lucrative troll activity, thereby squeezing Acacia
between the lawyers and the patent owners.
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much left for this troll. Over the five year period 2002-06, Acacia
Technologies Group lost close to $35 million. This is hardly a "very,
very profitable business model."31
At the end of the day, Acacia's principal victims are likely to be its
shareholders. As technology essayist Paul Graham32 notes, the way to
make money in technology business is to sell products, not license
patents.33
The reality of patent trial verdicts also far favors the defense side.
Of the patent verdicts available in trials to verdict in calendar years
2005 and 2006, the medium verdict was just shy of $4 million.34
Based on the statistics, in 2005 and 2006, a patent holder who
survived summary judgment and won at trial, recovered just about
what the case cost to prosecute and try.35 This is very much a
pets.com model for making money in the litigation business. The
remarkable thing is that plaintiffs' lawyers are even willing to take on
patent cases.
There are, of course, some rather notable exceptions, most notably
aggressive litigants who do make huge sums of money enforcing IP
portfolios. But these are not the Acacia's of the world; they are
companies like IBM and Texas Instruments, which brings us to myth
three.
IV. MYTH THREE: PATENT PLAINTIFFS ARE SMALL,
OPPORTUNISTIC SPECULATORS
Another firmly-held belief is that patent trolls are small,
opportunistic speculators who buy portfolios of patents for modest
sums, and then use them as litigation fodder. Once again the reality is
otherwise. As many have observed, IBM's patent licensing revenue is
stupendously large: does a troll cease to be a troll when it grows to be
a giant?
31 Sheils, supra note 7.
32 Paul Graham's technology essays are well worth reading. He is often right and always
lucid.
33 Paul Graham, Are Software Patents Evil?, Mar. 2006, http://www.paulgraham.com/
softwarepatents.html.
34 Paul M. Janicke, Patent Jury Verdicts: Myths & Realities, INTELLECTUAL PROP. TODAY,
July 2007, at 18, available at http://www.iptoday.com/pdf/2007/7/Janicke-July2007.pdf.
35 Id. at 19.
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Consider, too, Texas Instruments ("TI"). This company is one of
the first to see the wisdom in enforcing its patents by filing
infringement cases in the Eastern District of Texas, which sits in
Marshall, Texas. And this strategy worked; for example, TI won
significant cases and closed very large licensing agreements in 1999
and after.36 Was TI acting immorally by filing suit to enforce its
intellectual property rights? If not, then why was Burst.com acting
immorally when it sued Microsoft (and now Apple) to enforce its IP
rights?
For that matter, even Microsoft-a charter member of the BSA-
has been making noises about suing the open source community,
alleging that Linux violates "more than 200 of Microsoft's patents."37
Microsoft evidently sees nothing inconsistent in complaining about
patent trolls on the one hand while threatening to sue the open source
community on the other. To Microsoft, as a plaintiff, it is a matter of
principle and honor: "We live in a world where we honor, and support
the honoring of, intellectual property .... [Others] have to 'play by
the same rules as the rest of the business' ..... . "What's fair is fair.'3 8
One problem here is that "fair" is entirely situational. To Microsoft as
plaintiff, it is about honoring intellectual property; to Microsoft as
defendant, it is about patent trolls and shakedown litigation.
All of this leads to a fairly profound point: a patent troll is always
just "the other guy." It is noble to sue and ignoble to be sued.
V. MYTH FOUR: PATENT TROLLS EXPLOIT
"RENEGADE" JURISDICTIONS
This myth is at least partially true. Without question, plaintiffs
have been flocking to the Eastern District of Texas (Marshall) since
1999. Texas Instruments started this trend by filing significant patent
36 See Texas Instruments: Cross-license Agreement Expected to Bring More Than $1
Billion to TI Over Next lo yrs., M2 PRESSWIRE, May 25, 1999,
http://findarticles.com/p/arficles/mi-hb5243/is-1999o5/ai-n2o21o692 (a license
agreement projected to produce royalty payments of $1 billion following a jury trial in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, concluded in March 1999 in TI's
favor).
37 Roger Parloff, Microsoft Takes on the Free World, FORTUNE, May 14, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2007/os/28/10003386 7/ind
ex.htm.
38 Id. Along the same lines, Toshiba recently filed suit against numerous companies,
alleging DVD patent infringement and seeking damages and injunctive relief. A troll too?
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cases concerning semiconductor chips, which resulted in very
substantial settlements.39
There were very real reasons to file in Marshall. First, Judge Ward
had established a binding set of patent rules that moved cases toward
trial quickly; some (defendants) would say too quickly. Second, juries
in Marshall (and in nearby Tyler, Texas) proved receptive to plaintiff
patent cases, presumably believing in the sanctity of private property
and the inherent value of a blue ribbon patent. Statistics show a
significantly higher plaintiff win rate in Marshall, although defendants
do prevail at trial there, especially lately.
But all good things come to an end, and so too for the Eastern
District of Texas. The district has been too successful in attracting
patent cases, and the rocket docket is beginning to slow, markedly.
For example, in the last twelve calendar months, Judge Ward received
140 new patent cases. These are in addition to his existing docket.
With 144 new cases alone, one wonders how the court can manage the
docket, run claims construction hearings, issue thoughtful opinions,
and conduct trials.
In short, filing in Marshall is very much like buying Google stock-
perhaps a better idea three years ago.
VI. MYTH FivE: THERE HAS BEEN A FLOOD OF NEW PATENT CASES
Another article of faith is that the bankrupt patent system has
resulted in a flood of new patent cases. But this too is not exactly
right. In the past 30 years, the number of patent cases filed has
approximately tripled. Given the ever increasing importance of
intellectual property in today's economy, a tripling of cases over 30
years hardly seems a flood of new litigation.
Perhaps more importantly, however, any "flood" has now begun to
recede. The number of patent cases filed increased every year from
1991 to 2004 (beginning with 1,171 cases per year in 1991, and topping
at 3,075 per year in 2004). But, in 2005, the number of patent filings
fell almost lO%. That is, after 15 years of year-after-year increases, the
number of patent cases actually declined in 2005.
Were the central tenants of the anti-patent lobby true, that is that
weak cases produce lucrative returns, patent filings presumably would
continue to increase. Instead, the drop in 2005 seems evidence that
the demonization of the patent system has begun to dissuade would-
be plaintiffs.
39 Texas Instruments, supra note 36.
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VII. MYTH-MAKING: THE BSA AND THE COALITION
FOR PATENT FAIRNESS
The current misperceptions about "patent abuse," and the
reciprocal need for "patent reform," did not spring into being
unbidden. To the contrary, these myths have been carefully
inculcated by the BSA and its companion organization, The Coalition
for Patent Fairness. Beginning many years ago, both organizations
lobbied to create the impression that patent abuse warrants reform.
Typical is the following: "One of the top legislative priorities for BSA is
patent reform .... Reforming the existing patent system will also
alleviate troublesome elements from patent litigation, resulting in a
reduction of the costly and disruptive effects of abusive patent
practices."40 "Troublesome elements"? This McCarthyesque
vernacular is significant. Time and again, the anti-patent
organizations have heralded the "fact" of abuse and reciprocal need
for reform. After years of repetition, many accept both assertions as
true.
At bottom, what is really at stake here is the integrity of the
software patent system generally. The twin anti-patent organizations
are just that: anti-patent. Their goal is not to somehow winnow out
good from bad cases early on, nor ride herd on over-zealous plaintiff's
lawyers. Instead, they intended to eliminate software patents
themselves. The first phase has been the attack on abusive patent
suits; the second phase will be an attack on bad patents (already
underway); and the third phase will be a legislative or judicial
rejection of patents in the software area entirely. This is, without
question, the goal.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Recognizing a job well done, Google, Microsoft, Intel and their ilk
have demonized the patent system extraordinarily well. But what is
good for these large technology companies is, in this instance at least,
not good for America. When investing in innovation is bad business,
businesses will not invest in innovation. And that is bad for us all.
40 Press Release, Business Software Alliance, BSA Hosts Annual CEO Forum (June 9,
2005), available at http://www.bsa.org/country/News%2oand%2oEvents/
News%2oArchives/ BSA%2oHosts%2oAnnual%2oCEO%2oForum.aspx (emphasis
added).
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